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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the development, solution, and application of a location-allocation model for specialized 
health care services such as the treatment and rehabilitation necessary for strokes or traumatic brain injuries. 
The model is based on our experience with the Department of Veterans Affairs’ integrated service networks. The 
model minimizes the total cost borne by the health system and its patients and incorporates admission acuity 
levels, service proportion requirements, and admission retention rates. A common resource constraint is 
introduced at the facility level since treatment of multiple acuity levels involves the pooling of common 
resources. Realistic instances of the model with 20 potential service locations, 50 admission districts and up to 
five open treatment units for three levels of severity are solved in about 300 seconds. The applicability of the 
model is tested by an extensive managerial experiment using data derived from one of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs specialized healthcare services. We investigate the effects of five critical factors: (1) the degree 
of service centralization, (2) service level mandates by acuity, (3) lost admission cost by acuity, (4) facility 
overload penalty cost by acuity and (5) target utilization level by acuity and treatment unit. We examine the 
countervailing forces present in making healthcare service location decisions and the resulting tradeoffs from 
the implicitly multiobjective nature of the system. The experiment and analysis demonstrate that the major 
factors of the experiment have a significant bearing on the optimal assignment of admission districts to 
treatment units. 
Keywords 
Design of experiments, Integer programming, Location-allocation, Simulated annealing 
1. Introduction and motivation 
In the United States, healthcare remains an area of crucial concern for millions as evidenced by the current 
ongoing debate over the federal healthcare reform bill. Healthcare providers are pressured by two conflicting 
dimensions: ever-increasing healthcare costs and the public demand for access to cutting-edge treatment. As a 
result, healthcare providers have virtually no choice but to constantly seek to become as efficient as possible in 
all aspects of their operations. 
The original study that this paper extends is based on a perceived need to improve the delivery of specialized 
health services at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in terms of effectiveness and efficiency [1]. The VA is 
the primary organization charged with providing healthcare to veterans and the original study was based upon a 
funded research project that aimed to determine the optimal location of traumatic brain injury (TBI) treatment 
units for VA medical centers. As a not-for-profit service organization, the VA has to define optimality using a 
multi-objective approach where the cost of providing care (i.e., efficiency) and the level and extent of healthcare 
provided in terms of access and availability (i.e., effectiveness) are generally viewed as equally critical objectives. 
The research described in this paper extends the previous study and model in meaningful and important ways 
that we expect have applicability to nonprofit healthcare providers beyond the VA. 
The specific improvements to efficiency and effectiveness included in this paper are as follows: (a) Multiple 
levels of severity with capacity limits by facility and severity (sometimes called acuity). The justification for this is 
that treatment costs (including fixed costs of specialized equipment) are much higher for high levels of acuity. In 
turn, the high costs have to be offset by scale economies which make it impossible to replicate the same 
capacity to treat severe cases in every facility. (b) Common resource constraints at each facility. The need for 
this stems from the fact that many kinds of resources such as physicians, supplies, storage facilities, and 
operating theaters are common across severity levels but used at varying rates at different levels. Common 
resource availability constrains treatment at all severity levels in a facility. (c) Service level mandates, overload 
penalties, lost admission costs, and target utilization by severity level are factors introduced in the optimization 
model, whose impact is investigated in a managerial experiment described later. In this context, for each level of 
acuity (i) a service level mandate is a requirement to serve a particular proportion of eligible patients, (ii) a 
target utilization percentage is a proportion of capacity that management wishes to utilize in order to balance 
costly load on a facility versus the need to serve as many patients as possible (iii) an overload penalty is a cost 
associated with exceeding a facility’s utilization target, and (iv) lost admission costs are federal funding not 
obtained if patients are not served (admitted). 
In the model developed in this paper, the service level mandate is an explicit constraint while the other factors 
are included in the objective function so that violations of the corresponding managerial targets are penalized in 
accordance with the levels of the factors. The factors other than service level mandate are associated with 
targets that often trade off against each other rather than explicit requirements and the managerial experiment 
described later tracks the costs of not achieving the targets as the factor levels are varied. Instances of tradeoffs 
are service level versus overload and lost admissions versus target capacity utilization at a facility. Lost 
admissions and service level are related to effectiveness and overload and capacity utilization are related to 
efficiency (cost). 
This paper is organized as follows. The following section provides the literature review germane to our research. 
Section 3 presents the optimization model and defines the relevant decision variables and model coefficients. 
Following the model, Section 4 describes an extensive managerial experiment meant to evaluate the impact of 
important managerial parameters and discusses the results that we obtained from that experiment. Last, 
concluding remarks and future research directions are provided in Section 5. 
2. Literature review 
The purpose of location-allocation models is to concurrently determine optimal facility locations and the 
assignment of customers to open facilities. Since the research literature in facility location is vast, no attempt is 
made here to provide a comprehensive review. Rather, we direct the reader to a full review of general facility 
location models and the methods used to solve them found in Love et al. [2] and Cornuéjols et al. [3]. Instances 
of the application of location-allocation models to healthcare issues include hospital location in rural regions [4], 
geographical considerations in healthcare planning [5], locating blood banks [6], service mix and location in 
managed healthcare [7], trauma care involving hospitals and ambulances [8], the reorganization of liver 
transplant regions [9], and optimizing the location of specialized treatment facilities [10]. An extensive survey of 
the research regarding the location of healthcare facilities may be found in Daskin and Dean [11]. 
The location-allocation model developed in this paper involves mixed integer programming and is rooted in the 
classic uncapacitated facility location (UFL) model [12]. In practice, the UFL model is often modified to provide 
feasible templates of frequently occurring service or business scenarios which correspond to more complicated 
models. For example, the introduction of facility capacity limits leads to the capacitated facility location 
problem, and limiting the permitted number of open facilities leads to the p-median problem. The different 
versions of the UFL model such as one in which every location can be a facility and demand node and another in 
which facilities are limited to a subset of nodes and variants of the UFL model are known to be difficult to solve 
(particularly for large instances) since they belong to the NP-complete class of problems [13]. However, it may 
be noted that the variants may be significantly harder to solve than the UFL model since they contain constraints 
not found in the UFL model. Consequently, optimal solutions to our type of problem are difficult to obtain and 
very large instances may necessitate specialized solution approaches or heuristics such as Lagrangian 
relaxation [14], simulated annealing [15], and dual ascent [16]. While these sophisticated heuristics offer the 
advantage of reduced computational times, they generally provide near-optimal rather than optimal solutions to 
complex problems. After some experimentation, we found that the commercial-grade general-purpose 
optimization software CPLEX-OPL [17] solved most instances of problems in our research environment in 
reasonable computing time. Consequently, we adopted CPLEX-OPL as our solver engine for the model 
developed here. This model is described in the next section. 
3. The optimization model 
The primary goal of the optimization model developed in this paper is to provide a mathematical framework 
that incorporates the primary criteria of the VA as it seeks to serve veterans: (1) the cost of providing service and 
(2) the service level provided to the VA’s patients. The costs included in the model include fixed costs, treatment 
costs, travel costs, lodging costs, lost service costs, and overloading penalty costs. We note that patients or their 
families bear the cost of travel and hotel lodging of family members who accompany the patient to a given 
facility and other costs are borne by the VA. The service level, for each level of acuity, is defined as the 
proportion of eligible admissions served by the VA for a given geographical area. The model incorporates 
retention rates by distance traveled and these are incorporated according to multiple levels of acuity (i.e., 
reflecting the observation that patients are willing to travel relatively longer distances for higher levels of 
acuity). For the purposes of our model and its generalized application beyond the VA, we refer to acuity as 
representing the general medical condition of a potential patient where higher acuity patients will require 
longer lengths of stay and more resources than lower acuity patients. Our purpose behind this is simply to 
demarcate differing patient classes. A similar definition is applied to service levels in that we recognize the 
healthcare organization may need to maintain a certain volume to justify (either economically or by the 
decision-maker’s prerogative) why a service is provided at a given facility. Last, we treat the eligibility of 
veterans as potential patients as detailed in [1]. 
An important application of our model is to analyze the tradeoff between a centralized capacity policy with a 
relatively small number of treatment units generally located in large metropolitan areas versus a decentralized 
capacity policy with a relatively large number of geographically disperse treatment units, some of which may be 
located in rural or low-population density areas. While the primary analysis is in terms of cost, our model also 
assists decision-makers in fulfilling the service mission of the VA, including examining secondary objectives such 
as patient travel and lodging costs. A by-product of the degree of centralization adopted by the organization that 
is captured by our model is the level of employment corresponding to various policies. In government and/or 
unionized work environments, the staffing level may be important enough to be a criterion in its own right. 
While we do not view staffing in that manner in our research, our model allows the decision-maker to analyze 
the consequences of alternative staffing level restrictions. 
In addition to retention rates by acuity, the model includes constraints that ensure that the capacity of each 
potential treatment unit by acuity level is not exceeded and that mandatory service levels by acuity level are 
met. Parameter definitions ensure that the fixed cost of a treatment unit is a piecewise linear function of that 
unit’s capacity. It also includes a common resource limit for each medical center where the treatment unit may 
be located such that the common resources are those that are used by all acuity levels. There are also 
restrictions on the number of open treatment units by acuity level. It should be noted that the service mission of 
the VA is maintained through constraints that enforce service level mandates for each level of acuity (e.g., at 
least 70% of a target patient population should be served at VA-based treatment units). In this paper, a cluster 
of patient demand locations that the VA feels should be served by a single facility (i.e., open treatment unit in an 
open medical center) is labeled as a “district” or “patient district”. Typically, a district corresponds to an area 
code, but the definition allows some flexibility so that the units comprising the district may be aggregated 
upwards to represent larger geographic areas such as counties, states or regions, depending on need. 
Economies of scale and learning effects that result from increasing capacity may be modeled as nonlinear 
functions of volume. However, nonlinear elements tend to make already difficult integer combinatorial models 
quite intractable. On the other hand, linear approximations are tractable, and we represent fixed costs by 
piecewise linear functions of capacity. Capacity is divided into ranges from zero to some very high theoretical 
upper bound (conceivably, infinity). Each capacity range c is demarcated by a lower bound and an upper bound 
which depend on the acuity level. The piecewise linear approach is sufficiently flexible in that it can capture both 
economies and diseconomies of scale. We develop the model in two stages—in the first stage, the model has 
binary variables that model the piecewise linear functions of capacity and in the second stage we further 
eliminate these variables through a pre-processing stage. The reduction in the number of variables through this 
artifice greatly helps to achieve shortened computing times. Both the models are presented next, and the final 
version will be discussed in detail. The model developed in this study belongs to the category of binary integer 
programming models, which are widely prevalent in the facility location literature. The primary benefit of binary 
modeling in facility location analysis is that the binary (i.e., 0–1) variables act as on–off switches indicating 
whether or not treatment units (by acuity level) are available at a particular medical center. 
The basic assumptions of the model are as follows: (1) a deterministic model is sufficient and the degree of 
variability observed in the empirical data is not high enough to justify the complexity of a stochastic model, (2) 
the linear (or linearized) structure of the model is sufficient to capture the primary complexities and tradeoffs of 
the operating environment for delivery of specialized healthcare services for the VA (or other service-oriented 
entity), and (3) the data required by the model are available to the VA (or other entity). The organization of the 
model is as follows. First, the objective function that is minimized contains the sum of fixed overhead and labor 
costs, variable admission treatment costs, travel, lodging, and labor costs, and the cost of lost service. The 
constraints of the model ensure that each district is served by only one medical center with a single retention 
rate. Variable definitions (implemented as constraints) ensure that the retention rate applied corresponds to the 
distance between the district and the medical center. Other constraints ensure that the capacity of each medical 
center is not exceeded and that mandatory service rates and employment levels are met. Parameter definitions 
in the model ensure that the fixed cost per unit of a medical center is a piecewise linear function of the medical 
center’s capacity. The initial model, which has the additional difficulty of being a nonlinear mixed integer model 
(the nonlinearity is due to the first term of the objective function) is provided next. 
Model variables. 
𝑌𝑐
𝑠 = 1 if a treatment unit with acuity capability 𝑠 is open in center 𝑐, 0 otherwise; 
𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠 = 1 if the qth capacity category applies to center 𝑐, acuity 𝑠, 0 otherwise; 
𝑋𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑠 = 1 if district 𝑑, acuity 𝑠, is served by center 𝑐, with retention rate 𝑘, 0 otherwise. 
Model parameters. 
𝑑𝑐𝑑 = Distance in miles between district 𝑑 and center 𝑐; 
𝑀𝑥𝑑𝑠 = Maximum distance between a district and assigned center for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑡𝑐𝑑 = Transportation cost per mile between district 𝑑 and center 𝑐; 
𝑎𝑞𝑠 = Fixed cost per admission associated with capacity category 𝑞 for acuity 𝑠; 
𝐵𝑞𝑠
𝑢  = Upper capacity bound for capacity category 𝑞 for acuity 𝑠; 
𝐵𝑞𝑠
𝑙  = Lower capacity bound for capacity category 𝑞 for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑣𝑐𝑠 = Treatment variable cost per admission at center 𝑐 with acuity 𝑠; 
𝐶𝑐𝑠 = Specialized healthcare service capacity (in number of admissions) at center 𝑐 for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑅𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑠 = Proportion of admissions from district 𝑑 retained at center 𝑐 for retention rate 𝑘 and acuity 𝑠; 
𝑈𝑘𝑠 = Upper bound in miles for the 𝑘th retention rate; 
𝐿𝑘𝑠 = Lower bound in miles for the 𝑘th retention rate; 
𝑃𝑑𝑠 = Admission volume (total number of potential admissions) in district 𝑑, acuity 𝑠; 
𝑚𝑐𝑠 = Average length of stay in days per admission at center 𝑐 for acuity 𝑠; 
ℎ𝑐 = Average hotel charge per day for admission family at (near) center 𝑐; 
𝜙𝑠 = Mandated minimum proportion of admissions served by the VA system for acuity 𝑠; 
𝛺𝑠 = Penalty cost to the VA of a potential admission with acuity 𝑠 not treated by the system; 
𝑆𝑐𝑠 = Fixed minimum staffing level for acuity 𝑠 at center 𝑐; 
𝐺𝑐𝑠 = Additional staff per admission for acuity 𝑠 at center 𝑐; 
𝑒𝑐𝑠 = Average staff payment rate for acuity 𝑠 at center 𝑐; 
𝜔𝑠 = Mandated number of open centers for acuity 𝑠; 
𝜎𝑠 = Overloading penalty per admission for acuity 𝑠; 
𝜇𝑠 = Target utilization percentage for acuity 𝑠; 
𝛿𝑠 = Common resource utilization per admission for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑄𝑐 = Common resource capacity at center 𝑐; 
𝜌 = Common resource balance factor. 
 
The location-allocation model (NIVA) is formally defined below, using the variables and parameters defined 
above. 
Nonlinear initial model 

































(1) A district–acuity combination can be assigned only to an open center within the distance limit for the acuity 
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(9) Upper capacity limit for capacity rates 
𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠 𝐶𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠 𝐵𝑞𝑠
𝑢 ∀𝑞, 𝑠. 
(10) Lower capacity limit for capacity rates 
𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠 𝐶𝑐𝑠 ≥ 𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠 𝐵𝑞𝑠
𝑙 ∀𝑞, 𝑠. 




𝑠 ∈ {0,1}∀𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑘, 𝑠. 
Preprocessing steps. 
This model is the logical representation of the decision problem faced by the medical system we investigated. 
However, as noted previously, it incorporates two major drawbacks: (a) it is nonlinear due to the fixed cost term 
in the objective function: ∑  𝑐 ∑  𝑞 ∑ {𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠 𝑎𝑞𝑠𝐶𝑐𝑠 + 𝑆𝑐𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑠}
𝑠
𝑌𝑐
𝑠 and (b) it contains a very high number of binary 
variables of the types: 𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠  and 𝑋𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑠. That these features are serious barriers to implementation was made 
evident to us when models coded in the fast CPLEX system took many hours to solve even for medium-sized 
problems. As a result of this, we redesigned the model by eliminating the 𝛼𝑐𝑞
𝑠  variables altogether and replacing 
the 𝑋𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑠 variables with 𝑋𝑐𝑑
𝑠  variables. In effect, we precalculate the retention rates that (potentially) apply 
between medical centers and districts and also the capacity categories that apply to centers, both by acuity. As a 
result of these steps: (i) the nonlinearity in the model is eliminated (ii) the number of binary variables in the 
model is drastically reduced (iii) significant numbers of constraints in the model related to the eliminated 
variables are no longer needed and are therefore removed from the model. The result is a significantly more 
computationally tractable model. 
The actual coding steps are: (a) For retention rates by acuity, the following applies: If 𝐿𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑑𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑈
𝑘𝑠, then 
parameter 𝑅𝑐𝑑
𝑠  in the revised model (VA) below = 𝑅𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑠. (b) For capacity categories the following applies: If 𝐵𝑞𝑠
𝑙 ≤
𝐶𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝐵𝑞𝑠
𝑢 , then parameter 𝑎𝑐𝑠 in the revised model below = 𝑎𝑞𝑠. The revised model is provided below. 
General parameters. 
𝑁𝑠 = Number of acuity (severity) levels 
𝑁𝑐 = Number of centers 
𝑁𝑑 = Number of districts. 
Model variables. 
𝑌𝑐
𝑠 = 1 if a treatment unit with acuity capability 𝑠 is open in center 𝑐, 0 otherwise; 
𝑋𝑐𝑑
𝑠 = 1 if district 𝑑, acuity 𝑠, is served by center 𝑐, 0 otherwise. 
Model parameters. 
𝑑𝑐𝑑 = Average distance in miles between district 𝑑 and center 𝑐; 
𝑀𝑥𝑑𝑠 = Maximum distance between a district and assigned center for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑡𝑐𝑑 = Travel cost per mile between district 𝑑 and center 𝑐; 
𝑎𝑐𝑠 = Fixed cost per admission associated with center 𝑐 and acuity 𝑠; 
𝑣𝑐𝑠 = Treatment variable cost per admission at center 𝑐 with acuity 𝑠; 
𝐶𝑐𝑠 = Specialized healthcare service capacity (in number of admissions) at center 𝑐 for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑅𝑐𝑑
𝑠  = Proportion of admissions from district 𝑑 retained at center 𝑐 rate for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑃𝑑𝑠 = Admission volume (total number of potential admissions) in district 𝑑, acuity 𝑠; 
𝑚𝑐𝑠 = Average length of stay in days per admission at center 𝑐 for acuity 𝑠; 
ℎ𝑐 = Average hotel charge per day for admission family at (near) center 𝑐; 
𝜙𝑠 = Mandated minimum proportion of admissions served by the VA system for acuity 𝑠; 
𝛺𝑠 = Penalty cost to the VA of a potential admission with acuity 𝑠 not treated by the system; 
𝑆𝑐𝑠 = Fixed minimum staffing level for acuity 𝑠 at center 𝑐; 
𝐺𝑐𝑠 = Additional staff per admission for acuity 𝑠 at center 𝑐; 
𝑒𝑐𝑠 = Average staff payment rate for acuity 𝑠 at center 𝑐; 
𝜔𝑠 = Mandated number of open centers for acuity 𝑠; 
𝜎𝑠 = Overloading penalty per admission for acuity 𝑠; 
𝜇𝑠 = Target utilization percentage for acuity 𝑠; 
𝛿𝑠 = Common resource utilization per admission for acuity 𝑠; 
𝑄𝑐 = Common resource capacity at center 𝑐; 
𝜌 = Common resource balance factor. 
 
The location-allocation model (LRVA) is formally defined below, using the variables and parameters defined 
above. 
Linear revised model (LRVA). 
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(1) A district–acuity combination can be assigned only to an open center within the distance limit for the acuity 
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𝑠 ∈ {0,1}∀𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑠. 
Objective function. 
The first term in the objective function is the sum of fixed treatment cost and fixed staffing cost. The second 
term is the sum of variable treatment, travel, lodging, and staffing costs. The third term is lost admission cost 
and the fourth is the overloading penalty cost. It may be noted that lost admission cost decreases while the 
overloading penalty cost increases as the number of admissions increases. It can also be observed that the 
overloading penalty cost decreases when the target capacity utilization proportion (by acuity level) goes up. 
These tradeoffs imply that the model is, at least in some ways, multiobjective in nature. The tradeoffs are 
further explored in the managerial experiment described in Section 4. 
Constraints. 
The first set of constraints ensures that an admission district can be assigned to only open centers for each level 
of acuity and that, further, these candidate open centers must be within the system’s distance limit for the level 
of acuity. The second set of constraints further restricts the assignment of each admission district to exactly one 
open center by acuity. Constraint set (3) ensures that the total number of admissions assigned to a center must 
not exceed capacity by acuity. 
The fourth set of constraints imposes minimum service level mandates by acuity on the system while constraint 
set (5) ensures that no medical center violates its limits for common resources (such as physicians and operating 
theaters). Finally, the sixth set of constraints restricts the number of open centers for each level of acuity to 
those mandated by the system design. Binary restrictions on the variables are also part of the model. 
The managerial experiment described in Section 4 entails twenty candidate centers (𝑁𝑐 = 20) and fifty medical 
districts (𝑁𝑑 = 50) for each of three levels of acuity (𝑁𝑠 = 3). As a result, the LRVA model has (𝑁𝑠 × 𝑁𝑐) or 
60 𝑌𝑐
𝑠 location variables and (𝑁𝑠 × 𝑁𝑐 × 𝑁𝑑) or 3000 allocation variables for a total of 3060 binary variables. The 
corresponding number of constraints in the LRVA model is: (𝑁𝑠 × 𝑁𝑐 × 𝑁𝑑) + (𝑁𝑑 × 𝑁𝑠) + (𝑁𝑐 × 𝑁𝑠) + 𝑁𝑠 +
𝑁𝑐 = 3000 + 150 + 60 + 3 + 20 = 3233. 
4. Managerial experiment 
This section describes a managerial experiment that we conducted using the model presented in the previous 
section in order to investigate the nature of system behavior particularly in the context of the tradeoffs alluded 
to in Section 2. It was conducted on a Windows XP personal computer with 4 GB of RAM operating at 2.66 GHz. 
The experiment also evaluated the relative performance of a decentralized service system versus a centralized 
service system. Recapping the primary tradeoffs of the model, we have: (i) lost admission costs decrease while 
the overloading penalty cost increases as the number of admissions served increases and (ii) the overloading 
penalty cost decreases when the target capacity utilization proportion (by acuity level) increases. Since one of 
the main purposes of the managerial experiment is to evaluate tradeoffs between parameters such as the lost 
admission cost and service level mandate, we provide the values of those parameters in Table 1. Other details 
regarding data values are provided in the Appendix. The data are simulated based on a project funded by the VA 
but do not correspond to any specific values at the VA or other healthcare organization. 
Table 1. Parameters for the managerial experiment. 
Factor Level Acuity level     
1 2 3 
Target utilization (TU) (in %) 1 45 50 55  
2 50 60 70  
3 55 65 75 
Service level mandate (SLM) (in %) 1 50 60 70  
2 55 65 75  
3 60 70 80 
Lost admission cost (LAC) (in $) 1 100 200 300  
2 400 500 600  
3 700 800 900 
Overload penalty cost (OPC) (in $) 1 100 200 300  
2 400 500 600  
3 700 800 900 
 
Our initial analysis of the model was conducted by generating two instances for each combination of target 
utilization (TU), service level mandate (SLM), lost admission cost (LAC), and overload penalty cost (OPC). Each 
factor, as shown in Table 1, had three levels so the resulting experiment had 2 × 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 = 162 
observations. This was done in order to conduct a full fourway experimental design on the model to identify 
both the significant main effects and significant interactions so as to better guide decision-makers as they 
undertake location decisions. 
As shown in Table 2, Table 3, we provide the p-values for the fourway analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for 
seven key outputs from our model: (1) total objective function cost, (2) variable treatment cost, (3) variable 
staffing cost, (4) lodging cost, (5) lost admission cost, (6) overload capacity cost, and (7) percentage of 
admissions served. Scanning across both Table 2, Table 3, we note that all four factors contribute to the total 
objective function and the overload capacity cost but were not all equally significant for the other outputs. This 
is not surprising given how the four factors affect each of the outputs. Equally important is the presence (or 
absence) of significant interaction effects between the factor levels for the outputs. Overload capacity cost is 
strongly influenced by all four factors and their interactions regardless of number of treatment units. At the 
other end of the spectrum, admissions treated tended to be only affected by changes to the service level 
mandate in the two-treatment unit instance and only the service level mandate and lost admission cost in the 
five-treatment unit instance. 
Table 2. Analysis of variance results for two treatment units. 
Source DF Response 
variable 
      
  














p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value 
TU 2 0.0003 0.2264 0.3014 0.5990 0.3630 < 0.0001 0.5116 
SLM 2 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0084 0.3780 <0.0001 0.0010 < 0.0001 
LPC 2 < 0.0001 0.5323 0.4728 0.0491 <0.0001 < 0.0001 0.1951 
OPC 2 < 0.0001 0.0026 0.3500 0.8768 0.2458 < 0.0001 0.1857 
TU×SLM 4 0.5981 0.5862 0.7949 0.8487 0.7360 0.1289 0.3264 
TU×LPC 4 0.7171 0.9114 0.3541 0.5688 0.9242 0.0035 0.3975 
TU×OPC 4 0.7450 0.5628 0.5828 0.3704 0.2871 < 0.0001 0.4990 
SLM×LPC 4 < 0.0001 0.0750 0.3231 0.3369 <0.0001 0.0010 0.3996 
SLM×OPC 4 0.6778 0.4479 0.1055 0.6763 0.6487 < 0.0001 0.2402 
LPC×OPC 4 0.6718 0.2667 0.4758 0.5230 0.7190 0.0086 0.3328 
TU×SLM×LPC 8 0.4741 0.6513 0.3362 0.5589 0.9426 0.0239 0.5208 
TU×SLM×OPC 8 0.9550 0.6876 0.7476 0.6007 0.3990 0.0052 0.2584 
TU×LPC×OPC 8 0.7849 0.4893 0.7397 0.6010 0.6606 0.0563 0.5343 
SLM×LPC×OPC 8 0.2350 0.7473 0.3270 0.8706 0.7415 0.0022 0.5268 
TU×SLM×LPC×OPC 16 0.6004 0.6359 0.7441 0.8526 0.7615 < 0.0001 0.5477 
Model 80 < 0.0001 0.0577 0.4531 0.8739 <0.0001 < 0.0001 0.1039 
 
Table 3. Analysis of variance results for five treatment units. 
Source DF Response 
variable 
      
  














p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value 
TU 2 < 0.0001 0.3360 0.6114 0.5100 0.6692 < 0.0001 0.9719 
SLM 2 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 
0.0004 
0.0087 <0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0010 
LPC 2 < 0.0001 0.0001 0.0227 0.2431 <0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0578 
OPC 2 < 0.0001 0.3982 0.1964 0.7307 <0.0001 < 0.0001 0.8216 
TU×SLM 4 0.8120 0.8486 0.1477 0.1792 0.0903 0.0341 0.4389 
TU×LPC 4 0.5322 0.5459 0.4378 0.9469 0.3316 0.3784 0.4144 
TU×OPC 4 0.0620 0.2776 0.5797 0.3254 0.6900 < 0.0001 0.1851 
SLM×LPC 4 0.0282 0.2613 0.5930 0.7177 <0.0001 0.7791 0.0784 
SLM×OPC 4 0.8613 0.4832 0.5930 0.1630 0.6819 < 0.0001 0.5153 
LPC×OPC 4 0.5090 0.3532 0.8049 0.0758 0.0016 < 0.0001 0.4947 
TU×SLM×LPC 8 0.7968 0.6443 0.3257 0.3669 0.0003 0.4739 0.7177 
TU×SLM×OPC 8 0.7652 0.5997 0.1680 0.3023 0.6197 0.0906 0.5127 
TU×LPC×OPC 8 0.2579 0.7362 0.0188 0.1369 0.1263 0.4237 0.3180 
SLM×LPC×OPC 8 0.9369 0.5307 0.6650 0.8828 0.0373 0.9177 0.7901 
TU×SLM×LPC×OPC 16 0.8370 0.8889 0.3233 0.8814 0.4633 0.6204 0.2406 
Model 80 < 0.0001 0.0008 0.0375 0.3173 <0.0001 < 0.0001 0.1813 
 
Next, we discuss the primary managerial results by presenting them for a centralized two open medical center 
(for each level of acuity) system and also a more decentralized five open medical center (for each acuity level) 
system. This presentation facilitates a comparison between the two systems for each system tradeoff that is 
evaluated. 
First, we consider the objective value (i.e., total cost) as a function of a primary performance driver, the service 
level mandates. Fig. 1, which compares the four factors for two-center and five-center systems. All panels 
indicate that the objective value rises slowly as the service level mandates rise from level 1 to level 2 but 
subsequently rises much faster from level 2 to level 3 although the jump is much larger for the two-center 
system compared to the five-center system—this is because lost admission costs actually fall when service levels 
rise for a five-center system partially compensating for the increase of other costs. In turn, the decline in lost 
admission costs is a result of the fact that retention rates are primarily a function of distance. Thus, the relatively 
shorter travel distances of a five-center system (compared to a two-center system) correspond to higher 
retention for every level of acuity. 
 
Fig. 1. Interaction plots for average objective function value. 
 
We also provide other results that shed light on the impact of various factors on the functioning of the model. 
These include overloading cost by service level mandate, overloading cost by capacity utilization target, lost 
admission cost by utilization target, objective function value by lost admission penalty, and objective function 
value by overload penalty. These results are illustrated in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5, Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 2. Interaction plots for average treatment cost. 
 
Fig. 3. Interaction plots for average staffing cost. 
 
Fig. 4. Interaction plots for average lodging cost. 
 
Fig. 5. Interaction plots for average lost admission cost. 
 
Fig. 6. Interaction plots for average overload capacity cost. 
 
Another result of interest is the impact of the facility utilization target on the objective function (cost) as well as 
the proportion served. Capacity utilization targets are generally increased or decreased depending on the 
tradeoff between ‘stress’ levels on the system (which lead to system breakdowns) and the need for high service 
levels (or output in a manufacturing context). For instance, the desire to keep a relatively older facility 
functioning without too many breakdowns will lead decision-makers to set the capacity utilization targets (by 
severity) for that facility relatively low even though this may lead to lower current admissions. A relatively new 
facility, however, can withstand greater capacity utilization and this will lead decision-makers to set higher 
targets for this facility which leads to higher service levels and, implicitly, higher return on capital investment. 
The general expectation is that cost should go down with higher targets due to lower utilization penalties and 
lower lost admission costs. This expectation is met in both the two-center and five-center systems as seen 
in Fig. 7. The explanation is that the initial relaxation of the utilization targets and therefore the utilization 
penalties is not enough to compensate for the increase in treatment and other costs associated with serving a 
larger number of patients. 
 
Fig. 7. Interaction plots for average admissions treated. 
 
The further relaxation of utilization targets reduces utilization penalties sufficiently that the lower penalties 
along with lower lost admission costs are sufficient to compensate for higher treatment costs—hence, the 
proportion served goes up at the final level of utilization targets. Last, the proportion of admissions served as a 
function of the service level mandate. As expected, the service level rises with the service level mandate for 
both the two-center and five-center systems. Note however, that the five-center system serves more admissions 
than the two-center system which also corresponds to the fact that the five-center system is generally costlier. 
5. Conclusions and future research 
The research described in this paper has involved the development and application of a comprehensive model 
for location-allocation of specialized healthcare services. This model includes several additions to a standard 
healthcare location-allocation model including multiple acuity levels, multiple service level mandates by acuity, 
facility utilization targets by acuity, and a common resource constraint at each facility that limits the use of 
resources that are common to all levels of acuity (e.g., nurses and physicians). 
We conducted an extensive managerial experiment in order to assess the impact of several factors on key goals 
of the system such as total cost and service level (proportion served). These factors include lost admission cost, 
service level mandate, target utilization percent, and overloading penalty cost. Comparative results are provided 
regarding the impact of these factors for a two-center (i.e., centralized) system versus a five-center (i.e., 
decentralized) system. An important finding is that a decentralized system is costlier than a centralized one but 
also serves a higher proportion of admissions. A finding that is not necessarily intuitive is that the proportion 
served first decreases and then increases when facility utilization targets are increased. A comprehensive set of 
results is provided to assist managers with fine-tuning the parameters of the system. 
The model is applied in specific ways depending on the particular concerns of managers. As an illustration, if the 
healthcare manager aims to achieve the highest service level, Panel B of Fig. 1 shows that it makes little 
difference to total cost whether a centralized or decentralized system is used while the difference is substantial 
if a lower service level is desired (for instance, to reduce load on the system). In addition, if lost admissions cost 
is a particular source of concern, Panel B of Fig. 5 indicates that the centralized system results in higher lost 
admissions cost relative to the decentralized system. Combining the information from the two panels, the 
manager might favor the decentralized system particularly at the highest service level. 
Our future research is focused on extending the model from a non-profit environment to a for-profit one. This of 
course involves the introduction of revenue and pricing considerations—in particular, the elasticity of demand 
becomes an important consideration. Another consideration is the pricing of non-medical services such as 
single-room treatment, cable television, and the like. Finally, lost admission costs are much more difficult to 
evaluate in a for-profit setting—typically, they have to be estimated from data and are not available as a fixed 
cost per admission. To conclude, we believe that an extension of our model to the for-profit environment is 
challenging but worthwhile in terms of the much broader range of applicability that it promises. 
Appendix. 
This Appendix provides details on the statistical distributions and functional forms that were used to generate 
data for the computational experiment. All data are representative of the operational data provided to us by our 
anonymous healthcare organization but should not be construed as fact. We use the notation N(μ,σ) to indicate 
a normally distributed random variable with mean, μ, and standard deviation, σ. 
1. Annual number of admissions per district (varies normally between districts with mean and standard 
deviation as shown) 
Acuity level 1: N(1000,100) 
Acuity level 2: N(700,70) 
Acuity level 3: N(400,40). 
2. Capacity (i.e., number of admissions) per treatment unit for system with two open treatment units 
Acuity level 1: N(25,000,5000) 
Acuity level 2: N(17,500,5000) 
Acuity level 3: N(10,000,2500). 
3. Capacity (i.e., number of admissions) per treatment unit for system with five open treatment units 
Acuity level 1: N(10,000,500) 
Acuity level 2: N(7000,400) 
Acuity level 3: N(4000,300). 
4. Annual fixed treatment cost per treatment unit (in $) 
Acuity level 1: $2000×Capacity0.95 
Acuity level 2: $3000×Capacity0.95 
Acuity level 3: $4000×Capacity0.95. 
5. Variable treatment cost per admission (in $) 
Acuity level 1: N(1000,100) 
Acuity level 2: N(2000,200) 
Acuity level 3: N(3000,300). 
6. Hotel charge per day (in $) 
N(70,20). 
7. Length of stay (in days) 
Acuity level 1: N(3,1) 
Acuity level 2: N(7,2) 
Acuity level 3: N(14,3). 
8. Minimum staff 
Acuity level 1: N(4,1) 
Acuity level 2: N(6,1) 
Acuity level 3: N(8,2). 
9. Additional staff per patient 
Acuity level 1: N(0.01,0.003) 
Acuity level 2: N(0.02,0.003) 
Acuity level 3: N(0.03,0.003). 
10. Annual salary per individual staff (in $) 
Acuity level 1: N(50,000,10,000) 
Acuity level 2: N(60,000,10,000) 
Acuity level 3: N(70,000,10,000). 
11. Maximum service distance limit for two treatment unit system (in miles) 
Acuity level 1: 425 
Acuity level 2: 475 
Acuity level 3: 525. 
12. Maximum service distance limit for five treatment unit system (in miles) 
Acuity level 1: 250 
Acuity level 2: 300 
Acuity level 3: 350. 
13. Transportation cost per mile (in $) 
N(1,0.5). 
14. Common capacity available for treatment 
N(1.5,0.1)×Sum of individual Acuity level capacities. 
15. Common capacity utilization per admission (as a %) 
Acuity level 1: N(1.5,0.1)×0.33 
Acuity level 2: N(1.5,0.1)×0.334 
Acuity level 3: N(1.5,0.1)×0.336. 
16. Admission retention rates for Acuity level 1 
0–70 miles: 80% 
71–125 miles: 70% 
126–600 miles: 60%. 
17. Admission retention rates for Acuity level 2 
0–100 miles: 85% 
101–200 miles: 75% 
126–600 miles: 65%. 
18. Admission retention rates for Acuity level 3 
0–150 miles: 90% 
151–250 miles: 70% 
251–600 miles: 70%. 
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